38 | Missouri Policy Journal | Number 7 (Fall/Winter 2018)

The Sweeping Changes of Clean Missouri:
Issues of Redistricting Reform in Missouri

Debra Leiter, PhD
University of Missouri-Kansas City
On September 14, 2018, Cole County Circuit Judge
Daniel Green ordered Amendment 1, called “Clean
Missouri,” off of the November ballot for violating
the Missouri constitutional rule emphasizing that
initiatives can only cover one subject.1 Subsequently,
the Missouri Court of Appeals and the state Supreme
Court placed the issue back on the ballot, illustrating
the controversy and attention drawn by the Clean
Missouri initiative. And while Clean Missouri
advocates emphasize one idea—legislative ethics
reform in Missouri—the changes it calls for are
sweeping.
The Clean Missouri initiative, calling for reform in
the areas of redistricting, campaign finance,
legislative transparency, and lobbyists gifts, is the
most recent of a general trend towards ethics reform
in Missouri.2 Following the successful, although
legally challenged,3 2016 Missouri Initiative 2 that
capped campaign donations to state legislative
campaigns, Clean Missouri emphasizes transparency
and fairness as its political goals. The Clean Missouri
initiative has drawn a fair amount of attention, and
contention, since it began gathering signatures in
2017. Clean Missouri and its supporters claim that the
bill introduces much-needed reform to increase
fairness and accountability, and to limit the influence
of lobbyists and moneyed interests. Critics allege that
it is designed to impede the legislature’s
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constitutional role of drafting districts, and that it is
redistricting reform packed with other reforms to
make it seem more palatable.
Missouri, one of twenty-four states that allow for
initiatives, has seen a number of major institutional
and electoral reforms in recent years, including
introducing campaign contribution limits and
enacting voter identification laws in 2016. These
voter-initiated changes, along with more traditional
ethics changes proposed by the legislature, reflect a
demand for increased political accountability. Yet, as
attorney Dan Schnurbusch wrote, Missouri still has a
reputation for “some of the weakest ethics and
campaign finance laws in the nation.”4
Amendment 1 is designed to address a number of the
issues that have frequently been associated with
Jefferson City, especially issues of accountability,
monetary influence, and lack of transparency.5 Yet
how effective would these reforms be in increasing
political trust and responsiveness in the Show-Me
State?
In this article, I briefly review the proposals of
Amendment 1, and pay special attention to the issues
of redistricting in Missouri. Although campaign
finance reform and issues of lobbyist influence
remain a salient issue in Missouri, as elsewhere in the
United States, the issue of redistricting has drawn the
most political attention and ire towards Clean
Missouri, and thus this article examines
contemporary issues with Missouri’s somewhat
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complex current system and places the potential
reform into context.
What is Missouri Amendment 1?
Missouri Amendment 1, also known as the Clean
Missouri Initiative, is an initiative that would alter the
Missouri constitution to address a number of political
issues under the umbrella category of legislative
ethics. The changes run the gamut from small
modifications to existing law to potentially major
shifts in the political environment of Missouri state
legislative politics. Amendment 1 covers four areas:
lobbying, campaign finance, public records, and
redistricting.
Clean Missouri has placed prominent emphasis on the
role of money and accountability in Missouri politics,
and proposes new regulations on lobbying, campaign
finance, and transparency in its campaign. In the area
of lobbying, Amendment 1 has two provisions: first,
it would require a two-year delay before legislators
could become a registered, paid lobbyist; second, it
would reduce lobbyists gifts to $5,6 sometimes
referred to as the “cup of coffee rule.” Currently,
lobbyist gifts are allowed to both the legislator and
her friends or family. According to the Missouri
Ethics Commission, while the individual gifts are
small, and are primarily lunches and dinners, their
cumulative value adds up. State representatives and
their families received more $87,386 in reported
lobbyists gifts in 2018 alone, with state senators
reporting another $40,000 more. Members of the
Missouri state legislature vary widely on their total
accepted gifts, ranging from none to more than
$5,400.7 The proposed changes put Missouri more in
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line with contemporary lobbying regulation efforts
both in the United States and cross-nationally.8
Under the area of campaign finance, Missouri
Amendment 1 offers a minor change from the 2016
amendments. In addition to lowering the max
donations to $2,500 for the Missouri State Senate and
$2,000 for the Missouri State Assembly, Amendment
1 would not allow the Missouri legislature to pass
laws that would allow for unlimited campaign
donations. The current donation maximum for
individuals is set at $2,600 for all statewide offices,
even with some challenges and limitations set on the
original initiative.9
Under public record transparency, all legislative
records, including legislative emails, would be public
record, and thus apply these records to Missouri’s preexisting “sunshine laws.”10 Sunshine laws refer to
citizen access to public documents, materials, and
meetings. Although Missouri already has Sunshine
Laws, and indeed was a relatively early enactor,11
there have been recent attempts to give more teeth to
the laws. In 2018, more than five bills have been
introduced into the Missouri State Legislature in
regards to the existent Sunshine Laws.12 Clean
Missouri would make additional public records open
to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests.
Sunshine laws have recently risen to prominence in
Missouri following controversies surrounding former
Gov. Eric Greitens and his staff’s usage of textmessage destroying apps in what was perceived as a
ploy to avoid FOIA requests.13
Finally, Clean Missouri proposes to change the nature
of redistricting in Missouri. Amendment 1 calls for
the selection of a non-partisan state demographer,
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who would present the maps to legislative
commissions of the House and Senate. The state
demographer candidates would be chosen by the
Missouri state auditor, and the choice approved by the
Missouri State Senate majority and minority leaders.
The state demographer would emphasize, in order:
equal apportionment, the 1965 voting rights act,
efficiency, competitiveness, contiguity, existing
political subdivisions, and compactness.14 These
issues shall be discussed in greater detail below.
Amendment 1 has received donations and
endorsements from wide-ranging interests both
within and outside of Missouri. Clean Missouri has
been effective at raising money, receiving more than
$2 million in donations.15 Although Clean Missouri
has received endorsements from a number of
conservative legislators and organizations, including
former
governor
of
California
Arnold
Schwarzenegger,16 it has received the majority of its
support from progressive organizations and
individuals, including endorsements by the NAACP,
Sierra Club, Planned Parenthood and, indirectly, the
Open Society Policy Center, most prominently
associated with George Soros.17 This has been a
source of contention over Clean Missouri’s intent by
challengers of the bill.18 While a challenger
organization, made up of primarily Republican
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lawmakers, has formed Missourians First,19 they have
not yet begun raising donations or seeking
endorsements, most likely waiting until the legal
challenges are completed.
Supporters of the proposal argue that these reforms
address much-needed ethical issues at the heart of
Jefferson City. And Missouri’s government has
frequently been associated with high levels of
political influence by lobbyists, low regulations, and
low accountability. Indeed, Missouri rarely ranks
above the middle in evaluations of the state’s political
quality, ethics, and efficiency. In their State Integrity
Investigation, the Center for Public Integrity ranked
Missouri 26th in the nation on its governmental
integrity, with an overall grade of D-.20 The non-profit
Sunlight Foundation gives Missouri a grade of C on
lobbyist transparency, with no requirements for
lobbyists to disclose spending under a certain
threshold, their activity, or their earnings as a
lobbyist.21 Even after Amendment 2 in 2016,
Missouri’s $2,600 donation limit for state legislative
races sits at $1,600 dollars higher than the national
median.22 Attempts to limit lobbyist gifts through
policies at the state legislative level have consistently
stalled in the Senate.23 The ethics reforms proposed
by Clean Missouri appear to be popular amongst
voters and activists. Indeed, even the initiative
“‘Missourians First’ Forms to Oppose ‘Clean Missouri’
Ballot Measure,” The Missouri Times, July 26, 2018, accessed
September 20, 2018,
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opponents have had little criticism for the proposed
lobbying and finance reforms.

Missouri’s Current Redistrict Process
and How it Compares

However, there are two major criticisms of the bill
that have been levered by opponents of Amendment
1. The first critique is that the initiative violates the
constitutional requirement that initiatives only cover
a single subject, and only amend a single section of
the constitution. In fact, Clay County Judge John
Green did find that Amendment 1 was guilty of
“logrolling,” i.e., bundling together several distinct
issues in order to ensure their passage, although this
finding was overturned by the Kansas City Court of
Appeals.24

Gerrymandering is currently having its own political
moment. In 2018, voters in five states including
Missouri will vote on redistricting ballot measures.26
High profile legal challenges to maps drawn in
Pennsylvania, Maryland, North Carolina and
Wisconsin have led to increased attention on the
issue.27 And discussions of the 2018 election have
frequently featured the redistricting advantage
Republicans hold for House elections.28 Yet the issue
of redistricting, and especially gerrymandering—i.e,
redrawing districts to benefit a single party—has
drawn attention and critique from the beginnings of
the Republic, when, in 1810, Gov. Elbridge Gerry of
Massachusetts famously drew an oddly shaped,
salamander-like district for the electoral benefit of his
party in 1810.29

Yet for as much legal attention as the issues of
complexity for the bill has drawn, the primary area of
concern has focused on the issue of redistricting.
Opponents of the bill have charged that Clean
Missouri’s redistricting reform is a veiled effort to
increase the number of democrats in the state
legislature.25 Others criticize the emphasis on
competitiveness, worrying that it will lead to
divisions of traditional geographic boundaries in
Missouri.
Supporters of the bill argue that competitive districts
are key to a transparent and effective legislature, and
that the new office will increase both electoral
accountability and the legitimacy of the redistricting
enterprise. It is to the issue of redistricting that I now
turn.
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minority representation,30 although evidence suggests
that the impact of redistricting is often overstated.31
Yet the advent of computational analysis to aid in
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with the pace of technological innovation,32 has led to
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and increased concerns about the impact on political
outcomes.
Part of the controversy related to redistricting is the
shear variety of approaches to redistricting, which
varies markedly across the states.33 Although there is
a fair amount of variation, we can categorize
redistricting into roughly three strategies, which
emphasize who controls drawing the district lines:
legislative partisan control, bipartisan commissions,
and non-partisan commissions or agencies.34 The vast
majority of states, thirty-seven, use legislatively
drawn maps for their state legislatures, with the rest
divided about evenly between bipartisan and
nonpartisan commissions.35 Although there are
disagreements about the extensiveness of the effect,36
non-partisan commissions are frequently associated
with higher levels of compactness, competitiveness,
and lower levels of partisan bias.37 Bipartisan
commissions, in general, fall somewhere in the
middle. It is worth noting, though, that even nonpartisan redistricting can be accused of political
engineering, especially when trust is low across
parties,38 and that, under certain conditions, nonpartisan commissions may still have partisan
objectives.39
Missouri uses different redistricting conventions for
US Congressional districts than for the Missouri State
Legislature. The state legislature and state Senate are
drawn by politically appointed commissions, and
Jamie L. Carson and Michael H. Crespin, “The Effect of
State Redistricting Methods on Electoral Competition in United
States House of Representatives Races,” State Politics &
Policy Quarterly 4, no. 4 (December 1, 2004): 455–69,
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https://doi.org/10.1177/153244000400400406.
34
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(January 2012): 39–43, accessed September 19, 2018,
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35
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2018, https://doi.org/10.2307/439967; and Carson and Crespin,
“The Effect of State Redistricting Methods;” and Michael P.
McDonald, “A Comparative Analysis of Redistricting
33

would be best classified as having legislative
bipartisan control. The governor appoints bipartisan
commissions, from lists provided by the parties in the
state House and state Senate. For the senate, each
party provides a list of ten names, each having five
members on the committee. For the house, two
commission members are nominated from each
congressional district. At least 70 percent of the
commission must approve the plan, or the appellate
court will have the responsibility of drawing the plan.
By contrast, US Congressional districts are drawn by
the legislature, and might be best categorized as
having legislative partisan control. For new
congressional districts, the newly proposed maps,
drawn by legislative committees, are treated like any
other bill, passed by the state legislature and reviewed
by the governor.40
There have been challenges for both congressional
and state legislative redistricting in the last two
reapportionment cycles. In 2010, Gov. Jay Nixon
vetoed the legislature’s new Congressional district
map, although this veto was overturned.41 In the same
cycle, the state Senate redistricting commission failed
to reach an agreement, and the state appellate court,
by law, had the responsibility to draw the districts.
However, when that second map was found to be
unconstitutional, a new gubernatorially-selected
bipartisan commission was left scrambling to draw a
map, finishing after election filing for the upcoming
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2018, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-2754.1998.00455.x.
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2012 election had begun.42 Ten years prior in 2000,
after failing to reach an agreement, the state judiciary
stepped in to draw the new lines. In both cases, the
bipartisan commission failed to successfully
complete an accepted map, primarily based on issues
of compactness or dividing politically relevant
populations.43 Similar issues, and reliance on judicial
intervention, have been characteristics of Missouri
redistricting since the 1970s.
How Biased Are Missouri’s Legislative Districts?
Given the history of contention, it is worthwhile to
consider how much Missouri falls into the category of
“partisan gerrymandering.” Part of the challenge in
analyzing this question is the difference between
congressional and state legislative redistricting plans.
Most scholarly attention has focused on redistricting
for Congressional races, where Missouri’s partisan
legislative schema functions, rather than at the state
legislative level, which uses a bipartisan commission,
the subject of Amendment 1’s change. However,
congressional outcomes are still a useful starting
place, and Missouri, as is the case for many of the
other metrics of ethics reforms, falls somewhere in the
middle. According to the Electoral Integrity Project,
which uses expert surveys to evaluate the quality of
elections within a state, Missouri is ranked twentysixth on its overall election integrity, and on the bias
of the boundaries, ranked thirtieth.44 Among experts,
there is a clear if muted perception of bias.
However, actual evidence of partisan gerrymandering
for Missouri’s eight congressional seats is more
mixed. According to the Brennan Center, Missouri’s
congressional districts exhibit moderate skew across
Scott Lauck, “Missouri Officials Must Quickly Redraw
Senate Districts,” Missouri Lawyers Weekly, January 23, 2012,
accessed September 20, 2018,
https://molawyersmedia.com/2012/01/23/missouri-officialsmust-quickly-redraw-senate-districts/; and Levitt, “All About
Redistricting—Missouri.”
43
Levitt, “All About Redistricting—Missouri.”
44
Pippa Norris, Holly Ann Garnett, and Max Groemping,
“Perceptions of Electoral Integrity: The 2016 American
Presidential Election,” Electoral Integrity Project: Why
Elections Fail and What We Can Do About It (University of
Sydney, 2017), accessed September 20, 2018,
https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/pei-us-2016/. The
survey asked fourteen Missouri politics experts to rate district
boundaries based on bias against one party, incumbency bias,
and impartiality. Out of a possible score of one hundred,
42

three measures of gerrymandering, always below the
threshold of two Congressional seats, although the
non-partisan group Planscore assigns the Missouri
plan a much higher level of skew. 45 The Princeton
Gerrymandering
Project
demonstrates
that
Republican and Democratic candidates win with
about the same vote share (69 percent versus 70.1
percent), rather than one party winning with slim
majorities,
demonstrating
limited
partisan
gerrymandering.46 At the Congressional level then,
we have limited evidence that partisan
gerrymandering is greatly shaping electoral outcomes
directly.
The story remains relatively similar at the state
legislative level. One critical measure of
gerrymandering is the efficiency gap, initially
proposed by Nicholas Stephanopoulos and Eric
McGhee, as an evaluation of the degree of wasted
votes.47 Efficiency gap attempts to capture the
common gerrymandering strategies of “packing,” i.e.,
drawing supermajority districts of opposition party
supporters, and “cracking,” i.e., ensuring opposition
party supporters vote share is diluted across many
districts.48 The efficiency gap considers both excess
votes needed to win a seat (above 50 percent +1) and
votes towards candidates that do not win. The
difference between excess votes and losing votes is
divided by the total number of votes to calculate the
efficiency gap. According to analyses done by the
Associated Press, the Missouri State Legislature has
an efficiency gap of 5 percent, which, while higher
than twenty-three other states, does not cross the 8
percent threshold established as a partisan
gerrymander, and indeed, is just 1 percent higher than

Missouri’s score, at thirty, falls well below the highest
observed score, which is Iowa with a score of seventy-three,
but is also well above the lowest scoring state, North Carolina,
at a seven.
45
Laura Royden and Michael Li, Extreme Maps (New York,
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of Law, 2017) accessed September 20, 2018,
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Chicago Law Review 82 (2015): 831–900.
48
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the average.49 Nor does the state consistently
demonstrate a lopsided victory for one side at the
district level, with Democrats winning by an average
of 88 percent versus 85 percent for Republicans.
However, Simon Jackman, in his report for the
plaintiffs in Whitford v. Nichol, the court case
brought against the Wisconsin reapportionment plan,
finds that the 2014 plan was clearly skewed towards
the Republicans, with an efficiency gap above 10
percent,50 a result replicated by the non-profit
Planscore organization.51 Taken together, the results
indicate that, while there is evidence of partisan bias
in Missouri, the extensiveness is much more open to
interpretation.
By contrast, on the issue of uncontested and noncompetitive elections, the data paints a very clear
picture. Missouri has quite a high number of
uncontested seats, and that number is growing over
time. According to the Associated Press, more than
60 percent of voters cast a vote for an uncontested
state legislative election;52 since 2004, between 25
percent to more than 65 percent of races that were
uncontested.53 Uncontested elections are driven by
two institutional features: non-competitive districts
and term limits. Given that gerrymandering
contributes to uncompetitive districts, the number of
uncontested elections can be directly linked to
Samuel Wang, “Partisan Gerrymandering Across the 50
States,” Princeton Election Consortium (blog), July 16, 2017,
accessed September 20, 2018,
http://election.princeton.edu/2017/07/16/partisangerrymandering-across-the-50-states/.
50
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2015, accessed September 20, 2018,
http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/sites/default/files/Jackman
-WHITFORD%20V.%20NICHOL-Report_0.pdf.
51
“PlanScore: Missouri,” accessed September 24, 2018,
https://planscore.org/missouri. Planscore, a non-profit expertdriven analysis of redistricting, finds that Missouri’s current
plan displays a 9 percent efficiency gap. Additionally,
Planscore demonstrates skews in two other common measures
of gerrymandering, mean-median difference, and partisan bias.
52
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accessed September 24, 2018,
https://www.apnews.com/aaacba54b957450e9d0f79255d204c9
c.
53
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Districting Plan.” Jackman’s measure of the efficiency gap
includes uncontested elections; however, many measures
exclude them.
49

redistricting decisions.54 Even in contested elections,
few elections could truly be described as competitive.
In the 2016 election, only three of the seventeen races
for state Senate and seven of the 157 state House seats
were decided with a gap of less than 10 percent.55 If
Missouri districts are drawn to limit competitiveness
for incumbent parties, either through incumbent
engineering or natural gerrymandering, then
challengers may be simply unwilling to mount a
campaign they perceive as doomed to fail, and this
may have a deleterious effect on electoral
competition, leaving voters with no choice and little
efficacy.
The decline in competitive elections, and the increase
in uncontested ones, is strongly associated with a
number of negative outcomes. Elected representatives
in uncompetitive elections tend to be much less
legislatively active than those who face re-election
threats;56 when faced with the combination of
uncompetitive elections and term limits, Missouri
state legislators have much less incentive to be
responsive to their constituency’s demands.57
Additionally, as competitiveness decreases, voters
have less of an ability to punish poorly performing or
corrupt political representatives, and thus fear of reelection acts as a poor guarantor of good behavior.58
Add to this that non-competitive elections lower
William M. Salka, “Term Limits and Electoral Competition:
An Analysis of California Legislative Races,” State & Local
Government Review 37, no. 2 (2005): 116–26; and Seth E.
Masket and Jeffrey B. Lewis, “A Return to Normalcy?
Revisiting the Effects of Term Limits on Competitiveness and
Spending in California Assembly Elections,” State Politics &
Policy Quarterly 7, no. 1 (March 1, 2007): 20–38, accessed
September 20, 2018,
https://doi.org/10.1177/153244000700700102.
55
Missouri Secretary of State, “State of Missouri—Election
Archives-General Election 2018,” November 8, 2016, accessed
September 20, 2018,
https://enrarchives.sos.mo.gov/enrnet/default.aspx?eid=750003
949.
56
David M. Konisky and Michiko Ueda, “The Effects of
Uncontested Elections on Legislator Performance,” Legislative
Studies Quarterly 36, no. 2 (May 1, 2011): 199–229, accessed
September 20, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.19399162.2011.00011.x.
57
Masket and Lewis, “A Return to Normalcy?”
58
Petra Schleiter and Alisa M Voznaya, “Party System
Competitiveness and Corruption,” Party Politics 20, no. 5
(September 1, 2014): 675–86, accessed September 20, 2018,
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068812448690.
54

Number 7 (Fall/Winter 2018) | Missouri Policy Journal | 45

turnout, since voters feel little incentive to
participate.59 In Missouri, with a combination of
sunshine laws that do not apply to individual
legislators, short term limits, a capitol city far from
the major population areas60—all of which contribute
to low voter information—the lack of competitive
elections may create a perfect storm of poor
behavior.61
The Clean Missouri Redistricting Plan
The Clean Missouri redistricting plan is fairly unique.
Clean Missouri calls for the appointment of an
independent state demographer, who will have
primary responsibility for drawing state district lines.
This is, as far as I am aware, the only state that would
leave the drawing of the districts to a single
individual; in general, most non-partisan based
reforms have selected multi-person commissions
instead. The new state demographer will be appointed
from a list of candidates provided by the state auditor,
an elected office, based on approval by the majority
and minority leaders in the Missouri State Senate.62
The demographer would draw proposed maps, to be
evaluated and approved by the existing bipartisan
commissions, who would have the ability to alter the
maps, as long as they fit the newly established
redistricting criterion, and these changes receive 70
percent of the commission’s approval. Absent
changes or agreement, the demographer’s plan would
be enacted. Essentially, the Clean Missouri plan adds
an ostensibly non-partisan actor to the existing
bipartisan state plan of redistricting.
Would changing to a non-partisan actor have an
impact on the way Missouri’s districts are drawn?
While non-partisan commissions are frequently
associated with less partisan bias, it is worth noting
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59

that bipartisan commissions have similar outcomes.63
As noted above, Missouri’s existing use of a
bipartisan commission means that, while we might
expect some changes, they may be on the margins.
And although non-partisan commissions do lead to
some evidence of positive changes, they are not
strongly associated with a decline in non-competitive
elections.64 Additionally, while the process for
choosing the state demographer is based on a
bipartisan group of officials, by the nature of elected
officials, two-thirds of the deciding body will share a
partisan preference, meaning that, even with
bipartisan constraint, there are some concerns about
whether the state demographer will truly be
politically neutral.65 Importantly, however, given the
issues that the commissions have consistently faced
in reaching consensus, the addition of an external
agent, in this case the state demographer, along with
a clearer plan on how to deal with disagreement, may
allow for a greater chance of the state commission
reaching an agreement, and help to avoid long delays
as seen during the 2010 election cycle.
Along with changing who is responsible for drawing
district lines, Amendment 1 changes how the lines are
drawn. Previously, issues of compactness, contiguity,
and preserving state county lines were the primary
criterion of the redistricting commission, along with
the criterion of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1964,
which forbids the diminution of minority votes.66
Amendment 1 adds new criterion, and a newly
emphasized hierarchy, to Missouri districts. Along
with complying with equal population, first,
Amendment 1 would enshrine the VRA into Missouri
law. These proposed changes are already part of
Missouri redistricting criteria, and would not result in
any major political changes.
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However, a new addition to redistricting criteria,
Amendment 1 would then prize partisan fairness and
competitiveness. Building from recent court cases
and social scientific evaluations, partisan fairness
would be measured by using the efficiency gap.67
Competitiveness would be measured using partisanbias or partisan-symmetry, as formulated by Gary
King and Bernard Grofman, wherein simulations
would determine that wasted votes would not be
biased towards one party.68 Once again, as far as I am
aware, the Clean Missouri plan is unique in
emphasizing
both
partisan
fairness
and
competitiveness as criterion for evaluation, and
certainly unique in their primacy of place. Only
following these criterion would contiguity, existing
political boundaries, and compactness be considered.
It is challenging to say the degree to which the state
demographer will be able to consider all of these
factors when making her recommendations to the
commission. Given the distribution of the population
of Missouri, especially minority communities, and the
requirements of the Voting Rights Act, for areas
around St. Louis and Kansas City, the demographer
may be quite limited in the lines she can draw.69
While areas around Columbia and in suburban areas
may allow for some increased competitiveness, in
general, as cities and rural areas become increasingly
partisan, districts gerrymander naturally, and even
complex computational measures cannot create
competitiveness out of near unanimity.70 In addition,
there are concerns about the efficiency gap as an
effective measure of electoral competition, since it
cannot account for certain election or context specific
patterns.71 To be clear, this does not mean we should
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expect zero change in the number of competitive
districts; however, once again, changes are likely to
be marginal and measured, rather than drastic and
partisan.
For all that the direct effects will likely be moderate,
this does not mean that redistricting reform will have
no effect on Missouri politics. Redistricting reform
will not, on its own, turn a red state blue, make most
districts competitive, moderate political parties, or
eliminate partisan gridlock. But by creating a new
system of organization, Amendment 1 may make
strides to increase trust in the political system by
opening the system to voters and demonstrating that
reform can occur.72 In an era of rapidly declining
political trust and efficacy, any strides that can
combat this decline must be viewed in a positive
light.73
What will be critical to the success of Amendment 1
in returning trust to Jefferson City is managing
expectations. Following electoral system reform in
the 1990s in Japan, New Zealand, and Italy, many
voters were left disappointed at the limited changes,
and became more disenchanted with the existing
system of government as a result. This decline in
system
support
came
from
unmanaged
expectations—expecting more from electoral reform
than it could deliver.74 If Missourians have clear
expectations about what can, and importantly, cannot
be created from redistricting outcomes alone, then the
reduction of partisan gerrymandering, along with
other ethics reform, may help to clean the tarnished
image of legislative politics in Missouri today.
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